Starwood Real Estate Income Trust, Inc.
Sponsored by Starwood. REIT structure focused on private real estate.
REITPrivate Real Estate
- Net assets
- $4.06B
source
Quarterly report (Form 10-Q) · filed 2026-05-11 · period 2026-03-31
charter net assets = us-gaap:Assets 18,744,559,000 - us-gaap:Liabilities 14,680,344,000 = 4,064,215,000
Method Matched text template against the filing
Open the filing on SEC.gov · Full observation history
Technical locator
as of 2026-03-31 - NAV / share
- $19.54
source
Prospectus supplement (Form 424B3) · filed 2026-06-15 · period 2026-05-31
424B3 monthly pricing supplement (transaction price = NAV/share per its own text)
“to disclose the calculation of our May 31, 2026 NAV per share ... Transaction Price (per share) Class S $ 19.72 Class T $ 19.72 Class D $ 19.30 Class I $ 19.54 ”
Method Matched text template against the filing
Open the filing on SEC.gov · Full observation history
Technical locator
Canonical (canonical class) · 2026-05-31 - Net flows, last qtr
- -2.9% qtr ended 2026-03-31
- Distribution coverage (reported FFO)
- 68% period ended 2026-03-31
- Leverage in use
- 99% debt / equity 2.96x
- Total return, 12m
- -0.9% computed from NAV + distributions
What changed in the latest filings.
Current findings ordered by severity. Each observation remains traceable to its filed source.
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2026-03-31: only 3.0% of requests fulfilled. (2026-03-31)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2026-03-31: only 3.0% of requests fulfilled. The fund hit its redemption cap and rationed liquidity.
Why it matters and what changed
Occurrence event; see the filing text for terms vs the prior arrangement.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1711929/000119312526216496/ck0001711929-20260331.htm | redemption proration (2026-03-31)
The fund is at or near its allowed leverage limit (99% of permitted leverage in use as of 2026-03-31) (GAAP-equity approximation of a cost-basis charter test; the fund's own NASAA calculation may show compliance).
The fund is at or near its allowed leverage limit (99% of permitted leverage in use as of 2026-03-31) (GAAP-equity approximation of a cost-basis charter test; the fund's own NASAA calculation may show compliance). (Rule B8: Leverage headroom critical: headroom < 5% or ceiling breach; Urgent.)
Why it matters and what changed
The fund is essentially at or beyond its permitted leverage. This can force asset sales at bad prices or halt distributions/repurchases; for a BDC it is a statutory line, not a preference.
8.27 -> 1.28 (down 84.6% vs prior period); trailing 4-period average 11.42; same period prior year 26.02; comparison interval: ~3 months (2025-12-31 -> 2026-03-31; this fund's series is observed at that frequency, so 'month over month' rules compare consecutive observations)
Source: derived: (ceiling 300.0% of net assets - leverage 296.2%, denominator = charter net assets (total assets - total liabilities) 4,064,215,000) / ceiling * 100
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2026-02-28: only 3.0% of requests fulfilled. (2026-02-28)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2026-02-28: only 3.0% of requests fulfilled. The fund hit its redemption cap and rationed liquidity.
Why it matters and what changed
Occurrence event; see the filing text for terms vs the prior arrangement.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1711929/000119312526216496/ck0001711929-20260331.htm | redemption proration (2026-02-28)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2026-01-31: only 3.0% of requests fulfilled. (2026-01-31)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2026-01-31: only 3.0% of requests fulfilled. The fund hit its redemption cap and rationed liquidity.
Why it matters and what changed
Occurrence event; see the filing text for terms vs the prior arrangement.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1711929/000119312526216496/ck0001711929-20260331.htm | redemption proration (2026-01-31)
The fund is at or near its allowed leverage limit (101% of permitted leverage in use as of 2025-12-31) (GAAP-equity approximation of a cost-basis charter test; the fund's own NASAA calculation may show compliance).
The fund is at or near its allowed leverage limit (101% of permitted leverage in use as of 2025-12-31) (GAAP-equity approximation of a cost-basis charter test; the fund's own NASAA calculation may show compliance). (Rule B8: Leverage headroom critical: headroom < 5% or ceiling breach; Urgent.)
Why it matters and what changed
The fund is essentially at or beyond its permitted leverage. This can force asset sales at bad prices or halt distributions/repurchases; for a BDC it is a statutory line, not a preference.
swung from 6.79 to -0.95 vs prior period; trailing 4-period average 9.94; same period prior year 18.85; comparison interval: ~3 months (2025-09-30 -> 2025-12-31; this fund's series is observed at that frequency, so 'month over month' rules compare consecutive observations)
Source: derived: (ceiling 300.0% of net assets - leverage 275.2%, denominator = charter net assets (total assets - total liabilities) 4,367,591,000) / ceiling * 100
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-09-30: only 4.0% of requests fulfilled. (2025-09-30)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-09-30: only 4.0% of requests fulfilled. The fund hit its redemption cap and rationed liquidity.
Why it matters and what changed
Occurrence event; see the filing text for terms vs the prior arrangement.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1711929/000119312525277275/ck0001711929-20250930.htm | redemption proration (2025-09-30)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-08-31: only 4.0% of requests fulfilled. (2025-08-31)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-08-31: only 4.0% of requests fulfilled. The fund hit its redemption cap and rationed liquidity.
Why it matters and what changed
Occurrence event; see the filing text for terms vs the prior arrangement.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1711929/000119312525277275/ck0001711929-20250930.htm | redemption proration (2025-08-31)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-07-31: only 4.0% of requests fulfilled. (2025-07-31)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-07-31: only 4.0% of requests fulfilled. The fund hit its redemption cap and rationed liquidity.
Why it matters and what changed
Occurrence event; see the filing text for terms vs the prior arrangement.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1711929/000119312525277275/ck0001711929-20250930.htm | redemption proration (2025-07-31)
em 8.01. (2026-04-29)
em 8.01. Other Events. Share Repurchase Plan Effective April 29, 2026, the Company’s board of directors (the “ Board ”) amended the Company’s share repurchase plan (the “ SRP ”), beginning with repurchases submitted during the month of April 2026 such that (i) repurchase requests made upon the death or qualifying disability of a stockholder who is a natural person will be repurchased in full to th
Why it matters and what changed
The rules governing how investors exit changed. For a semi-liquid fund the repurchase program IS the liquidity; any change to caps, frequency, or pricing deserves a direct read.
Occurrence event; see the filing text for terms vs the prior arrangement.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1711929/000119312526192168/ck0001711929-20260429.htm | Item 8.01
Net flows deteriorated to $-117.1M from $-128.4M (period ended 2026-03-31).
Net flows deteriorated to $-117.1M from $-128.4M (period ended 2026-03-31). (Rule C15: Net-flow deterioration: net flows negative; Notify.)
Why it matters and what changed
The fund is shrinking: money going out exceeds money coming in. Persistent negative net flows change the fund's behavior (what it can buy, what it must sell) even before any gate is near.
$-128.4M -> $-117.1M (up 8.8% vs prior period); trailing 4-period average $-118.8M; same period prior year $-80.3M; breach persisted 14 consecutive periods (escalated per the two-stage ladder); comparison interval: ~3 months (2025-12-31 -> 2026-03-31; this fund's series is observed at that frequency, so 'month over month' rules compare consecutive observations)
Source: derived: gross_share_sales + drip_reinvestment - shares_redeemed_dollars
Mortgage collateral taken (foreclosure / deed in lieu / REO): d by the Operating Partnership or newly acquired properties. (2026-03-31)
Mortgage collateral taken (foreclosure / deed in lieu / REO): d by the Operating Partnership or newly acquired properties. The underlying interest of real properties sold to investors pursuant to such private placements are leased-back to a wholly owned subsidiary of the Operating Partnership on a long-term basis throug
Why it matters and what changed
Occurrence event; see the filing text for terms vs the prior arrangement.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1711929/000119312526216496/ck0001711929-20260331.htm | collateral taken
The fund leaned harder on leverage: 92% -> 99% of its allowed leverage in use in one period (period ended 2026-03-31).
The fund leaned harder on leverage: 92% -> 99% of its allowed leverage in use in one period (period ended 2026-03-31). (Rule C22: Leverage creep: headroom down >= 5 percentage points in one period; Notify.)
Why it matters and what changed
The fund leaned meaningfully harder on its leverage in a single period. Even far from the ceiling, the direction and speed of travel matter; creep compounds quietly.
8.27 -> 1.28 (down 84.6% vs prior period); trailing 4-period average 11.42; same period prior year 26.02; breach persisted 3 consecutive periods (escalated per the two-stage ladder); comparison interval: ~3 months (2025-12-31 -> 2026-03-31; this fund's series is observed at that frequency, so 'month over month' rules compare consecutive observations)
Source: derived: (ceiling 300.0% of net assets - leverage 296.2%, denominator = charter net assets (total assets - total liabilities) 4,064,215,000) / ceiling * 100
FFO covered only 57% of distributions in the period ended 2026-03-31; the gap was funded from capital or gains.
FFO covered only 57% of distributions in the period ended 2026-03-31; the gap was funded from capital or gains. (Rule C24: Distribution coverage (REIT, FFO basis): distribution_ffo_coverage < 100%; Notify.)
Why it matters and what changed
Distributions exceed FFO (funds from operations, the standard REIT earnings measure that adds real-estate depreciation back to net income). The gap is funded from capital or gains, and a stated yield propped up this way is fragile -- the same read as C21, on the earnings concept that actually applies to a real-estate distributing vehicle.
24.08 -> 57.27 (up 137.8% vs prior period); trailing 4-period average 15.74; same period prior year -12.11; breach persisted 14 consecutive periods (escalated per the two-stage ladder); comparison interval: ~3 months (2025-12-31 -> 2026-03-31; this fund's series is observed at that frequency, so 'month over month' rules compare consecutive observations)
Source: derived: ffo / distributions_declared * 100 (windows matched on both ends)
Net flows deteriorated to $-128.4M from $-132.6M (period ended 2025-12-31).
Net flows deteriorated to $-128.4M from $-132.6M (period ended 2025-12-31). (Rule C15: Net-flow deterioration: net flows negative; Notify.)
Why it matters and what changed
The fund is shrinking: money going out exceeds money coming in. Persistent negative net flows change the fund's behavior (what it can buy, what it must sell) even before any gate is near.
$-132.6M -> $-128.4M (up 3.2% vs prior period); trailing 4-period average $-109.6M; same period prior year $-92.2M; breach persisted 13 consecutive periods (escalated per the two-stage ladder); comparison interval: ~3 months (2025-09-30 -> 2025-12-31; this fund's series is observed at that frequency, so 'month over month' rules compare consecutive observations)
Source: derived: gross_share_sales + drip_reinvestment - shares_redeemed_dollars
Departure of Directors or Certain Officers; Election of Directors; Appointment of Certain Officers; Compensatory Arrangements of Certain Officers. (2025-12-31)
Departure of Directors or Certain Officers; Election of Directors; Appointment of Certain Officers; Compensatory Arrangements of Certain Officers. On December 31, 2025, Andres Panza resigned as Head of Asset & Portfolio Management and director of Starwood Real Estate Income Trust, Inc. (the “Company”), effective immediately. Mr. Panza’s resignation was not due to any disagreement with the Company, its advisor or any of its affiliates. SIGNATURE Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf
Why it matters and what changed
Key-person changes at externally managed funds are one of the few governance signals these structures emit. A single departure is usually routine; a pattern (or a departure near other stress signals) is not.
Occurrence event; see the filing text for terms vs the prior arrangement.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1711929/000119312526005534/ck0001711929-20251231.htm | Item 5.02
Mortgage collateral taken (foreclosure / deed in lieu / REO): mercially reasonable terms or at all; • acquired properties may fail to perform as expected; • acquired properties... (2025-12-31)
Mortgage collateral taken (foreclosure / deed in lieu / REO): mercially reasonable terms or at all; • acquired properties may fail to perform as expected; • acquired properties may be subject to litigation risks; • acquired properties may be located in new markets in which we may face risks associated with a lack of mar
Why it matters and what changed
Occurrence event; see the filing text for terms vs the prior arrangement.
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1711929/000119312526117060/ck0001711929-20251231.htm | collateral taken
The fund leaned harder on leverage: 85% -> 92% of its allowed leverage in use in one period (period ended 2025-12-31).
The fund leaned harder on leverage: 85% -> 92% of its allowed leverage in use in one period (period ended 2025-12-31). (Rule C22: Leverage creep: headroom down >= 5 percentage points in one period; Notify.)
Why it matters and what changed
The fund leaned meaningfully harder on its leverage in a single period. Even far from the ceiling, the direction and speed of travel matter; creep compounds quietly.
14.87 -> 8.27 (down 44.4% vs prior period); trailing 4-period average 17.60; same period prior year 25.05; breach persisted 2 consecutive periods (escalated per the two-stage ladder); comparison interval: ~3 months (2025-09-30 -> 2025-12-31; this fund's series is observed at that frequency, so 'month over month' rules compare consecutive observations)
Source: derived: (ceiling 300.0% of net assets - leverage 275.2%, denominator = charter net assets (total assets - total liabilities) 4,367,591,000) / ceiling * 100
FFO covered only 24% of distributions in the period ended 2025-12-31; the gap was funded from capital or gains.
FFO covered only 24% of distributions in the period ended 2025-12-31; the gap was funded from capital or gains. (Rule C24: Distribution coverage (REIT, FFO basis): distribution_ffo_coverage < 100%; Notify.)
Why it matters and what changed
Distributions exceed FFO (funds from operations, the standard REIT earnings measure that adds real-estate depreciation back to net income). The gap is funded from capital or gains, and a stated yield propped up this way is fragile -- the same read as C21, on the earnings concept that actually applies to a real-estate distributing vehicle.
11.33 -> 24.08 (up 112.5% vs prior period); trailing 4-period average -1.61; same period prior year -35.17; breach persisted 13 consecutive periods (escalated per the two-stage ladder); comparison interval: ~3 months (2025-09-30 -> 2025-12-31; this fund's series is observed at that frequency, so 'month over month' rules compare consecutive observations)
Source: derived: ffo / distributions_declared * 100 (windows matched on both ends)
Net flows deteriorated to $-132.6M from $-97.2M (period ended 2025-09-30).
Net flows deteriorated to $-132.6M from $-97.2M (period ended 2025-09-30). (Rule C15: Net-flow deterioration: net flows negative; Notify.)
Why it matters and what changed
The fund is shrinking: money going out exceeds money coming in. Persistent negative net flows change the fund's behavior (what it can buy, what it must sell) even before any gate is near.
$-97.2M -> $-132.6M (down 36.5% vs prior period); trailing 4-period average $-100.6M; same period prior year $-95.8M; breach persisted 12 consecutive periods (escalated per the two-stage ladder); comparison interval: ~3 months (2025-06-30 -> 2025-09-30; this fund's series is observed at that frequency, so 'month over month' rules compare consecutive observations)
Source: derived: gross_share_sales + drip_reinvestment - shares_redeemed_dollars
The fund is using 85% of its allowed leverage as of 2025-09-30 (GAAP-equity approximation of a cost-basis charter test; the fund's own NASAA calculation may show compliance).
The fund is using 85% of its allowed leverage as of 2025-09-30 (GAAP-equity approximation of a cost-basis charter test; the fund's own NASAA calculation may show compliance). (Rule B7: Leverage headroom floor: headroom < 15% of ceiling; Notify.)
Why it matters and what changed
The fund is operating close to its permitted leverage (over ~87% of what its ceiling allows). The cushion protecting it from a forced deleveraging or covenant problem is thin.
21.26 -> 14.87 (down 30.1% vs prior period); trailing 4-period average 21.80; same period prior year 27.86; comparison interval: ~3 months (2025-06-30 -> 2025-09-30; this fund's series is observed at that frequency, so 'month over month' rules compare consecutive observations)
Source: derived: (ceiling 300.0% of net assets - leverage 255.4%, denominator = charter net assets (total assets - total liabilities) 4,714,855,000) / ceiling * 100
FFO covered only 11% of distributions in the period ended 2025-09-30; the gap was funded from capital or gains.
FFO covered only 11% of distributions in the period ended 2025-09-30; the gap was funded from capital or gains. (Rule C24: Distribution coverage (REIT, FFO basis): distribution_ffo_coverage < 100%; Notify.)
Why it matters and what changed
Distributions exceed FFO (funds from operations, the standard REIT earnings measure that adds real-estate depreciation back to net income). The gap is funded from capital or gains, and a stated yield propped up this way is fragile -- the same read as C21, on the earnings concept that actually applies to a real-estate distributing vehicle.
swung from -29.72 to 11.33 vs prior period; trailing 4-period average -16.42; same period prior year -113.58; breach persisted 12 consecutive periods (escalated per the two-stage ladder); comparison interval: ~3 months (2025-06-30 -> 2025-09-30; this fund's series is observed at that frequency, so 'month over month' rules compare consecutive observations)
Source: derived: ffo / distributions_declared * 100 (windows matched on both ends)
Historical findings (85)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-06-30: only 4.0% of requests fulfilled. (2025-06-30)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-05-31: only 3.0% of requests fulfilled. (2025-05-31)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-04-30: only 3.0% of requests fulfilled. (2025-04-30)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-02-28: only 4.0% of requests fulfilled. (2025-02-28)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2025-01-31: only 4.0% of requests fulfilled. (2025-01-31)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2024-11-30: only 4.0% of requests fulfilled. (2024-11-30)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2024-10-31: only 4.0% of requests fulfilled. (2024-10-31)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2024-08-31: only 4.0% of requests fulfilled. (2024-08-31)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2024-07-31: only 4.0% of requests fulfilled. (2024-07-31)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2024-06-30: only 4.0% of requests fulfilled. (2024-06-30)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2024-05-31: only 3.0% of requests fulfilled. (2024-05-31)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2024-04-30: only 37.0% of requests fulfilled. (2024-04-30)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2024-03-31: only 24.0% of requests fulfilled. (2024-03-31)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2024-02-29: only 40.0% of requests fulfilled. (2024-02-29)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2024-01-31: only 48.0% of requests fulfilled. (2024-01-31)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2023-12-31: 2.9% requested, only 37.9% of requests fulfilled. (2023-12-31)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2023-11-30: 3.8% requested, only 52.5% of requests fulfilled. (2023-11-30)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2023-10-31: 4.5% requested, only 44.9% of requests fulfilled. (2023-10-31)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2023-09-30: 3.3% requested, only 31.3% of requests fulfilled. (2023-09-30)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2023-08-31: 3.9% requested, only 51.3% of requests fulfilled. (2023-08-31)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2023-07-31: 3.6% requested, only 55.3% of requests fulfilled. (2023-07-31)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2023-06-30: 3.2% requested, only 32.9% of requests fulfilled. (2023-06-30)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2023-05-31: 4.2% requested, only 47.8% of requests fulfilled. (2023-05-31)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2023-04-30: 4.2% requested, only 47.7% of requests fulfilled. (2023-04-30)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2023-03-31: 3.3% requested, only 30.4% of requests fulfilled. (2023-03-31)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2023-02-28: 4.0% requested, only 49.6% of requests fulfilled. (2023-02-28)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2023-01-31: 5.2% requested, only 38.6% of requests fulfilled. (2023-01-31)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2022-12-31: 4.2% requested, only 20.0% of requests fulfilled. (2022-12-31)
Redemptions prorated for the period ending 2022-11-30: 3.2% requested, only 63.0% of requests fulfilled. (2022-11-30)
Net flows deteriorated to $-97.2M from $-80.3M (period ended 2025-06-30).
The fund is using 86% of its allowed leverage as of 2025-06-30 (GAAP-equity approximation of a cost-basis charter test; the fund's own NASAA calculation may show compliance).
FFO was negative in the period ended 2025-06-30; distributions were funded entirely from capital, asset sales, or borrowings, not operations.
lation FD Disclosure On June 6, 2025, the board of directors of Starwood Real Estate Income Trust, Inc. (2025-06-09)
Departure of Directors or Certain Officers; Election of Directors; Appointment of Certain Officers; Compensatory Arrangements of Certain Officers. (2025-05-12)
NAV per share ($20.97) is 1.6% below its trailing four-observation average ($21.31) as of 2025-04-30.
Net flows deteriorated to $-80.3M from $-92.2M (period ended 2025-03-31).
Departure of Directors or Certain Officers; Election of Directors; Appointment of Certain Officers; Compensatory Arrangements of Certain Officers. (2025-03-31)
FFO was negative in the period ended 2025-03-31; distributions were funded entirely from capital, asset sales, or borrowings, not operations.
Net flows deteriorated to $-92.2M from $-95.8M (period ended 2024-12-31).
FFO was negative in the period ended 2024-12-31; distributions were funded entirely from capital, asset sales, or borrowings, not operations.
NAV per share ($21.80) is 1.2% below its trailing four-observation average ($22.07) as of 2024-10-31.
Net flows deteriorated to $-95.8M from $-307.3M (period ended 2024-09-30).
FFO was negative in the period ended 2024-09-30; distributions were funded entirely from capital, asset sales, or borrowings, not operations.
Net flows deteriorated to $-307.3M from $-470.4M (period ended 2024-06-30).
The fund leaned harder on leverage: 66% -> 72% of its allowed leverage in use in one period (period ended 2024-06-30).
FFO covered only 34% of distributions in the period ended 2024-06-30; the gap was funded from capital or gains.
ely preceding month) pursuant to the Company’s share repurchase plan. (2024-05-23)
Net flows deteriorated to $-470.4M from $-555.1M (period ended 2024-03-31).
The fund leaned harder on leverage: 61% -> 66% of its allowed leverage in use in one period (period ended 2024-03-31).
FFO covered only 85% of distributions in the period ended 2024-03-31; the gap was funded from capital or gains.
NAV per share ($23.09) is 0.5% below its trailing four-observation average ($23.21) as of 2024-02-29.
NAV per share ($22.96) is 2.7% below its trailing four-observation average ($23.59) as of 2024-01-31.
Net flows deteriorated to $-555.1M from $-574.3M (period ended 2023-12-31).
NAV per share fell 4.2% from $23.90 to $22.90 (2023-12-31).
NAV per share ($22.90) is 4.7% below its trailing four-observation average ($24.04) as of 2023-12-31.
Net outflow of 5.6% of NAV in the period ended 2023-12-31.
FFO was negative in the period ended 2023-12-31; distributions were funded entirely from capital, asset sales, or borrowings, not operations.
Credit facility new or amended: 3 occurrence(s), 2017-12-15 to 2023-12-18
NAV per share fell 2.9% from $24.62 to $23.90 (2023-11-30).
Net flows deteriorated to $-574.3M from $-607.0M (period ended 2023-09-30).
Net outflow of 5.2% of NAV in the period ended 2023-09-30.
FFO covered only 62% of distributions in the period ended 2023-09-30; the gap was funded from capital or gains.
Net flows deteriorated to $-607.0M from $-569.4M (period ended 2023-06-30).
Net outflow of 5.2% of NAV in the period ended 2023-06-30.
FFO covered only 41% of distributions in the period ended 2023-06-30; the gap was funded from capital or gains.
Departure of Directors or Certain Officers; Election of Directors; Appointment of Certain Officers; Compensatory Arrangements of Certain Officers. (2023-05-09)
NAV per share ($25.32) is 1.7% below its trailing four-observation average ($25.75) as of 2023-04-30.
Net flows deteriorated to $-569.4M from $-233.4M (period ended 2023-03-31).
NAV per share fell 2.2% from $26.12 to $25.54 (2023-03-31).
FFO was negative in the period ended 2023-03-31; distributions were funded entirely from capital, asset sales, or borrowings, not operations.
NAV per share ($26.12) is 1.0% below its trailing four-observation average ($26.39) as of 2023-02-28.
NAV per share ($26.04) is 2.6% below its trailing four-observation average ($26.74) as of 2023-01-31.
Redemptions accelerated to $779.7M from $402.4M the prior period (period ended 2022-12-31).
NAV per share fell 2.6% from $27.05 to $26.34 (2022-12-31).
Redemptions accelerated to $402.4M from $118.3M the prior period (period ended 2022-09-30).
FFO was negative in the period ended 2021-09-30; distributions were funded entirely from capital, asset sales, or borrowings, not operations.
Departure of Directors or Certain Officers; Election of Directors; Appointment of Certain Officers; Compensatory Arrangements of Certain Officers. (2021-01-15)
Departure of Directors or Certain Officers; Election of Directors; Appointment of Certain Officers; Compensatory Arrangements of Certain Officers. (2020-11-06)
, which DRIP is incorporated herein by reference. (2020-10-21)
NAV per share fell 2.2% from $21.68 to $21.20 (2020-03-31).
The fund leaned harder on leverage: 49% -> 59% of its allowed leverage in use in one period (period ended 2020-03-31).
FFO was negative in the period ended 2020-03-31; distributions were funded entirely from capital, asset sales, or borrowings, not operations.
FFO covered only 76% of distributions in the period ended 2019-09-30; the gap was funded from capital or gains.
Departure of Directors or Certain Officers; Election of Directors; Appointment of Certain Officers; Compensatory Arrangements of Certain Officers. (2019-04-11)
Departure of Directors or Certain Officers; Election of Directors; Appointment of Certain Officers; Compensatory Arrangements of Certain Officers On January 16, 2018, the board of... (2018-01-16)
How the fund has moved.
Net asset value, total return, capital flows, and distribution coverage across the filing record.
Coverage basis note
What moved inside the book.
Filed portfolio-health facts and position changes. Missing disclosures stay visibly missing.
No structured portfolio-health series or position-change events have been captured for this fund.
Where exit demand met the cap.
Stated cap: 2% of NAV/month. Rationed in 35 of 40 disclosed periods; last gated Mar 2026.
| Period | Requested | Filled | Cap used | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-03-31 | 66.7% | 3% | 100% | rationed |
| 2026-02-28 | 66.7% | 3% | 100% | rationed |
| 2026-01-31 quarter | 66.7% | 3% | 100% | rationed |
| 2025-09-30 | 50.0% | 4% | 100% | rationed |
| 2025-08-31 | 50.0% | 4% | 100% | rationed |
| 2025-07-31 | 50.0% | 4% | 100% | rationed |
| 2025-06-30 | 50.0% | 4% | 100% | rationed |
| 2025-05-31 | 66.7% | 3% | 100% | rationed |
| 2025-04-30 quarter | 66.7% | 3% | 100% | rationed |
| 2025-02-28 | 50.0% | 4% | 100% | rationed |
| 2025-01-31 quarter | 50.0% | 4% | 100% | rationed |
| 2024-11-30 | 50.0% | 4% | 100% | rationed |
| 2024-10-31 quarter | 50.0% | 4% | 100% | rationed |
| 2024-08-31 | 50.0% | 4% | 100% | rationed |
| 2024-07-31 | 50.0% | 4% | 100% | rationed |
| 2024-06-30 | 50.0% | 4% | 100% | rationed |
| 2024-05-31 | 66.7% | 3% | 100% | rationed |
| 2024-04-30 | 5.4% | 37% | 100% | rationed |
| 2024-03-31 | 8.3% | 24% | 100% | rationed |
| 2024-02-29 | 5.0% | 40% | 100% | rationed |
| 2024-01-31 | 4.2% | 48% | 100% | rationed |
| 2023-12-31 | 2.9% | 38% | 100% | rationed |
| 2023-11-30 | 3.8% | 52% | 100% | rationed |
| 2023-10-31 | 4.5% | 45% | 100% | rationed |
| 2023-09-30 | 3.3% | 31% | 100% | rationed |
| 2023-08-31 | 3.9% | 51% | 100% | rationed |
| 2023-07-31 | 3.6% | 55% | 100% | rationed |
| 2023-06-30 | 3.2% | 33% | 100% | rationed |
| 2023-05-31 | 4.2% | 48% | 100% | rationed |
| 2023-04-30 | 4.2% | 48% | 100% | rationed |
| 2023-03-31 | 3.3% | 30% | 100% | rationed |
| 2023-02-28 | 4.0% | 50% | 100% | rationed |
| 2023-01-31 | 5.2% | 39% | 100% | rationed |
| 2022-12-31 | 4.2% | 20% | 100% | rationed |
| 2022-11-30 | 3.2% | 63% | 100% | rationed |
| 2022-10-31 | 2.2% | 100% | 110% | cap expanded |
| 2022-09-30 quarter | Not disclosed | 100% | Not disclosed | filled |
| 2022-06-30 quarter | Not disclosed | 100% | Not disclosed | filled |
| 2022-03-31 quarter | Not disclosed | 100% | Not disclosed | filled |
| 2021-12-31 | Not disclosed | 100% | Not disclosed | filled |
How the balance sheet is funded.
Borrowings, unused capacity, and synthetic exposure are separated so unlike risks do not collapse into one ratio.
No structured financing components have been captured for this fund.
How the offering is divided.
A filed share-class breakdown and terms-based role descriptions. This is not an estimate of who owns the fund.
No filed share-class terms have been captured for this fund; ownership type is therefore not inferred.
Management fee: 1.25% of nav plus dst property consideration per year. source. As compensation for its services, the Advisor is entitled to an annual management fee equal to (i) 1.25% of the Company's NAV per annum, payable monthly, before giving effect to any accruals for the management fee, the stockholder servicing fee, the performance participation interest, or any distributions, plus (ii) 1.25% per annum of the aggregate DST Property consideration for all DST Properties subject to the FMV Option held by the Operating Partnership -- the Advisor does not receive a duplicative management fee with respect to any DST Property (the two legs are mutually exclusive per property, not additive on the same asset). The Operating Partnership separately pays the Advisor a management fee equal to 1.25% of the NAV attributable to Operating Partnership units held by third-party unitholders. Commencing May 2024, the Advisor has agreed to waive 20% of its management fee -- reducing the EFFECTIVE rate from 1.25% of NAV to 1.00% of NAV -- until the Company's share repurchase plan is reinstated to its full monthly (2% of NAV) and quarterly (5% of NAV) limits; this waiver was still in effect as of this 10-K's fiscal year 2025 reporting period. The 1.25% contractual rate is captured as numeric_value; the active waiver is noted here rather than blocking the headline, per the same convention used for other funds' currently-active partial waivers above (e.g. Cascade Private Capital Fund).
The evidence beneath the page.
Filed terms and recent documents remain available without crowding the primary research flow.
Term register (3)
| Term | Description | Value | Effective |
|---|---|---|---|
| advisory_fee_schedule | As compensation for its services, the Advisor is entitled to an annual management fee equal to (i) 1.25% of the Company's NAV per annum, payable monthly, before giving effect to any accruals for the management fee, the stockholder servicing fee, the performance participation interest, or any distributions, plus (ii) 1.25% per annum of the aggregate DST Property consideration for all DST Properties subject to the FMV Option held by the Operating Partnership -- the Advisor does not receive a duplicative management fee with respect to any DST Property (the two legs are mutually exclusive per property, not additive on the same asset). The Operating Partnership separately pays the Advisor a management fee equal to 1.25% of the NAV attributable to Operating Partnership units held by third-party unitholders. Commencing May 2024, the Advisor has agreed to waive 20% of its management fee -- reducing the EFFECTIVE rate from 1.25% of NAV to 1.00% of NAV -- until the Company's share repurchase plan is reinstated to its full monthly (2% of NAV) and quarterly (5% of NAV) limits; this waiver was still in effect as of this 10-K's fiscal year 2025 reporting period. The 1.25% contractual rate is captured as numeric_value; the active waiver is noted here rather than blocking the headline, per the same convention used for other funds' currently-active partial waivers above (e.g. Cascade Private Capital Fund). | 1.25 pct_annual_of_nav_plus_dst_property_consideration | Date not captured |
| leverage_ceiling | ed in substantial part by borrowing, which increases our exposure to loss. Under our charter, we have a limitation that precludes us from borrowing in excess of 300% of our net assets, which approximates borrowing 75% of the cost of our investments (unless a majority of our independent directors approv | 300.0 pct_of_net_assets | Date not captured |
| repurchase_program_terms | Share Repurchase Plan: aggregate repurchases limited to 2% of aggregate NAV per month (measured using the aggregate NAV as of the end of the immediately preceding month) and 5% of aggregate NAV per calendar quarter (measured using the aggregate NAV as of the end of the immediately preceding quarter). | 2.0 pct_of_aggregate_nav_per_month | Date not captured |
Recent filings
| Filed | Form | Accession |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-30 | 8-K | 0001193125-26-290199 |
| 2026-06-17 | DEF 14A | 0001193125-26-274336 |
| 2026-06-17 | DEFA14A | 0001193125-26-274347 |
| 2026-06-15 | 424B3 | 0001193125-26-271041 |
| 2026-05-29 | 8-K | 0001193125-26-246478 |
| 2026-05-14 | 424B3 | 0001193125-26-224088 |
| 2026-05-11 | 10-Q | 0001193125-26-216496 |
| 2026-04-30 | 8-K | 0001193125-26-196329 |
| 2026-04-29 | 424B3 | 0001193125-26-192182 |
| 2026-04-29 | 8-K | 0001193125-26-192168 |
| 2026-04-16 | 424B3 | 0001193125-26-158768 |
| 2026-03-31 | 8-K | 0001193125-26-133484 |
| 2026-03-20 | 10-K | 0001193125-26-117060 |
| 2026-03-20 | 424B3 | 0001193125-26-117084 |
| 2026-03-17 | 424B3 | 0001193125-26-111037 |